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THRIVING ON ADVERSITY: CORPORATE TREATMENT
AND MISTREATMENT OF CONSUMERS IN THE WAKE
OF HURRICANE KATRINA
Norman I. Silber *
I. Introduction: Ordinary Provisions in Extraordinary Times
M any of the everyday contracting practices that sellers and
lenders use when they sell and lend are unfair. The
unfairness is too often discounted by academics and deemed
insufficient for redress by courts, legislatures, or agencies, mainly
because the impact is marginal and scattered, rather than
concentrated and devastating. According to widely accepted
views of contract formation and enforcement, consumers should
bear the economic costs associated with the form agreements to
which they commit themselves; the underlying assumption here
being that market forces over time will discipline sellers who try
to overreach by using adhesive contract terms in standard-form
consumer contracts.
At moments of extreme social dislocation, however, the
impact of the routine 'kicks and shoves' that consumers endure
because of adhesive terms is magnified, and the classical
assumptions-however appropriate they may be in ordinary
periods-come into greater doubt. The adhesive contract terms
* Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School. This article is part one of a two-part
series that originated from concern about victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, and subsequent research conducted while preparing a presentation for
the 2006 Annual Conference of The American Council on Consumer Interests
held in Baltimore, Maryland. The author would like to thank Michael
Greenfield, Alan Resnick, and Marshall Tracht for helpful suggestions; he
would like to acknowledge a large debt of gratitude to Toni Aiello for her
perceptive reading and relentless pursuit of source material. Special thanks is
due to Brandon Okano, my chief research assistant for this study. Ilan Weiser
provided helpful assistance. Additional thanks to students in the Hofstra New
Orleans relief group, and to my consumer law Hofstra students who listened to
a presentation of portions of this project. Thanks also to the editorial staff of
the Loyola Consumer Law Review.
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which insulate sellers from costs that are associated with
unforeseen catastrophic events and distribute them entirely to
consumers may seem exceptionally unjust; so also may the terms
which excuse sellers of responsibilities for continuing to provide
services but do not excuse consumers of their payment
obligations; or the debt collection rules which insist on the
satisfaction of regular payment obligations notwithstanding
greatly altered circumstances. These commonplace provisions
pile relatively small economic injuries on top of the very large
ones that are generated by the catastrophe. The aggregated
violence of these financial injuries will be large, and the sting of
all these "minor" costs. will no longer seem as bearable by
consumers.
When a hurricane strikes or a flood rises, therefore, unfair
practices that typically are hidden or dismissed as minor can
become visibly painful and obviously undesirable from a social
point of view. Not only are small injuries capable of exacerbating
the debt burdens of individual consumers, but these injuries are
experienced collectively, so that they potentially become more
apparent to the public at large than at other times. Losses that
consumers normally endure atomistically and sporadically occur
simultaneously under the circumstances of a catastrophe. In the
wake of Hurricane Katrina - the most severe domestic
American catastrophe in modern memory - it is perhaps
surprising that consumer financial losses attributable to seller
exertions of rights based on form agreements did not receive
closer attention.
It is true that reports about the misfortunes of the victims
caught in the path of Hurricane Katrina drew a great amount of
media attention in newspapers and on nightly television news
broadcasts. For months after the hurricane passed and the worst
flooding subsided, daily press coverage documented both the
flawed recovery efforts and the overwhelming difficulties that
many Gulf State residents experienced, including obtaining the
restoration of essential services, finding decent temporary
housing, applying for relief payments, and obtaining payment on
insurance claims.
Outside of the Southern states, however, most of the
attention to "consumer" and "marketplace" problems - on
television and radio news coverage, on the Internet, and also in
newspapers and magazines - was devoted to warning
immediate victims of the storm about construction scammers and
con artists (and warning the wider public about flood-damaged
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cars and charity frauds).' This coverage, which was typical of the
coverage of many previous hurricanes, focused on the
exploitation of victims or donors to relief funds by fraudulent and
disreputable fringe operators. In the midst of natural disasters
and catastrophes, fringe actors pitch scams and con schemes
involving unworthy products at susceptible populations. There is
no question that raising awareness about salvage vehicles and
charity frauds during such trying times are important pieces of
the consumer education puzzle! But compared to other equally-
grave consumer problems connected with the hurricanes and
their aftermath, these are not the problems upon which the press
or leaders of the consumer movement or even attorney generals in
the affected states should have been focusing.
If they had focused their attention on the debt collection
practices and other predatory policies of well-established
businesses, as well as fringe actor misbehavior, then opinion
leaders, government officials, and consumer advocates would
probably have been shocked with the results. It is the conclusion
of this study after examining corporate consumer credit practices
during and after the hurricane that, measured in terms of the
aggregate impact on general consumer welfare, it was the action
of mainstream mortgagees, bank loan officers, credit card issuers,
utility companies, and health care provider payment collectors
that more adversely affected the lives of the victims of the storm
than did fringe actors. The payment creditors collectively
diminished access to home ownership, health services, leisure
1 See, e.g., Pbs.org, Katrina Charity Scams,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/weather/july-dec05/charities_9-13.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2009); Msnbc.com. Cars of Katrina,
http://risingfromruin.msnbc.com/2005/1 1/cars of katrina.html (last visited
Oct. 16, 2009).
2 National news reports about construction scams and phony charity
schemes were abundant after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. One indication of
the interest in charity schemes and construction frauds in aftermath of the
hurricanes is that a search going back one year, combining in the Lexis
databases on March 10, 2006, ["fraud" and "Katrina" and "New Orleans"]
produced ninety magazine stories, 587 major newspaper stories, and 2,216
local newspaper articles. The search: [hurricane and Katrina and "New
Orleans" and charity and (scam or phony or scheme)], turned up eight
magazine stories, sixty-eight stories in major papers, and 329 local newspaper
articles. But stories about problems with major banks, insurance companies,
and utilities were much less common: the search [hurricane and Katrina and
"New Orleans" and problems and "insurance checks"] turned up only five
magazine stories, twenty-six articles in major papers, and sixty-eight stories in
local newspapers.
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time enjoyment, and the ability to purchase basic necessities of
life.
With few exceptions the aggregate debt collection activity of
the major commercial actors, especially in the financial sector,
has not been studied, even four years after the cataclysmic event.3
This article therefore reviews some of the hardships imposed by
corporate credit, sales, and leasing agreements which aggravated
the more tangible injuries brought about by Hurricane Katrina.
It examines how mainstream housing, banking, lending, and
select basic utility companies responded to consumer problems in
the wake of the hurricanes, in order to learn about the costs and
burdens that commercial entities imposed. It also suggests certain
reforms to the laws of consumer credit, which would apply only
in times of catastrophes, and other reforms, which, exposed by
catastrophic events, might be proposed on a more general basis.
Parts II-IX explore the way vendors and lenders handled
consumer service and credit agreements. Part X examines the
limited effectiveness of government responses. Part XI concludes
that the normal financial impact of the natural catastrophe was
magnified substantially by lenders and vendors who took
advantage of credit agreements by transferring and externalizing
payment risks. The adverse impact on consumers was further
exacerbated by the aversion of regulators and other actors in the
legal system to alleviate the debt burdens thus created. Part XII
also sketches an agenda for consumer reform to address both the
I It deserves noting that there were some groups who focused their
criticism on mainstream commercial creditor practices. . See discussions in the
text, infra. ACORN (The Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now), later maligned for alleged unlawful activities in other locations, engaged
in repeated efforts in Texas and Louisiana to educate the press and the public
about the ways mortgage lenders contributed to consumer distress. ACORN
played an important role in calling "town hall meetings" to discuss problems
created by Katrina and Rita; it created a Hurricane Survivor's Association;
and it fought to improve the housing of evacuees. See http://comm-
org.wisc.edu/pipermail/colist/2005-September/004010.html (visited Oct. 30,
2009). Consumers Union and the Consumer Federation of America issued joint
letters calling upon state insurance commissioners to protect insurance
consumers, see Letter from J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance for the
Consumer Federation of America and Rob Schneider, Senior Staff Attorney
for Consumers Union, to J. Robert Wooley, Commissioner for the Louisiana
Department of Insurance; Walter Bell, Commissioner -for the Alabama
Department of Insurance; and George Dell, Commissioner for the Mississippi
Insurance Department (Sept. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/katrina-insurance.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2009).
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extraordinary and ordinary problems illuminated by recent
events.
II. Monetary Limits to Corporate Compassion: The Mortgage
Lenders
Phyllis Agee's mortgage lenders told her last week that
she will get another ninety-day deferment on payments -
unless she starts working before that, and then they
want her to resume payments on her ruined house.
With car payments and other bills coming due, she
wants to start working... But she doesn't think she can
juggle mortgage and rent if she doesn't get an insurance
check soon. Even if she had that money, she isn't sure it
makes sense to start rebuilding her house before the
levees are repaired...
After the hurricane struck, hundreds of thousands of homes
were damaged or completely destroyed; and hundreds of
thousands of lives were disrupted for indefinite periods. In
Louisiana alone, approximately 217,000 homes were lost. To
make matters worse, many of the affected homeowners were
poor. In fact, roughly 26,000 families in the city had been living in
poverty - and had little insurance.' The Mortgage Bankers
Association estimated that as many as 100,000 of those who were
affected had no federal flood insurance.6 Thousands .of people
living in South Louisiana did have flood insurance; nevertheless,
many were underinsured and did not get enough in benefits to
pay off the mortgages on their ruined homes.
4 Phyllis Agee, a 39-year-old single mom, as portrayed by Anna Varela,
Living in Limbo: Resources, Patience Begin to Run Out; Three Months after
Katrina, Evacuees Wait on Insurance, Fend off Bill Collectors., ATLANTA J.&
CONST., Dec. 18, 2005, at 1D.
' Editorial, Try to See it Our Way, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan.
22, 2006 at 6.
6 Storm Victims' Loans in Jeopardy: Borrowers, Lenders in Areas Hit by
Hurricane Wait to See What Federal Help's Available, TIMES UNION
(Albany), Dec. 27, 2005 at El, available at
http://archives.timesunion.com/mweb/wmsql.wm.request?oneimage&imageid=
6314806 [hereinafter Loans in Jeopardy].
7 Editorial, supra note 5.
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In gestures of compassion immediately after the
hurricanes hit, mortgagees informed homeowners that their
minimum mortgage payment obligations would be suspended.
Virtually all the major home lenders granted victims an initial
ninety-day reprieve from payments, late fees, and damaging
reports to credit agencies.8 The Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council9 ("FFIEC") urged financial institutions to
"consider all reasonable and prudent steps to assist customers'
and credit union members' cash and financial needs in areas
affected by Hurricane Katrina. '"1 A press release issued by the
8 Id. at 6; see, e.g., Press Release, JPMorgan Chase, Chase, Bank One
Announce Disaster Relief for Customers Affected by Hurricane Katrina (Sept.
3, 2005), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/79401544lxx 17160/36740589-
f28b-4cf3-8730-5b7fddade49c/172182.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). See also
Company Policies for Katrina Victims,
http://clarkhoward.com/topics/katrina-policies.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
9 The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
Interagency is a governmental body designed to promote uniformity in the
supervision and examination of financial institutions by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), National Credit Union Administrations
(NCUA), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS). It is also charged with facilitating public access to
data which lenders are required to disclose under the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975.
1o In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, almost everybody
experienced a problem related to disruptions of the financial payment system.
including: problems getting checks cashed; using ATM machines; locating
credit cards, important financial records, and identification cards; wiring
money to friends and relatives; and similar problems. The FFIEC
recommended but could not mandate that banks and other financial
institutions take such steps as waving ATM machine fees, increasing ATM
cash limits, easing restrictions on cashing out-of-state and non-customer
checks, delaying delinquency notices to credit bureaus, and easing credit card
limits and terms for new loans. See Joint Release, Bd. Of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., Nat'l Credit Union Admin., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and Offiuce of Thrift Supervision to All Depository Institutions (Sept. 2, 2005),
available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?JNR= 1&Doc=64B5 8LZM.x
ml (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). Later, in November, the same group urged
forbearance "when appropriate" by financial institutions when dealing with
individual consumers. While recognizing that deferral programs and
individual workout arrangements would vary, the agencies encouraged
institutions "to provide flexible repayment terms at the end of the deferral
period, such that lump sum payments of all deferred interest and principal do
not become due immediately when payments resume." Press Release, Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (Nov. 30, 2005), available at-
Vol. 22:2
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FFIEC asked government agencies to "continue to encourage
lenders to work with both individual and commercial borrowers
who were affected by the storms."" The FFIEC further
acknowledged that:
[U]ncertainty exists for many borrowers and it will take
time to work through each individual situation.
Granting additional deferral periods for some borrowers
in accordance with sound risk management practices
may be appropriate given that the timing and amount of
insurance payments, disaster payments, and other
assistance may still be unknown."
With respect to tenant evictions, there were mandatory freezes
imposed on tenant evictions; but in all other respects, the
government did not impose any mandatory rule of leniency on
creditors. The voluntary nature of these FFEIC requests for
lenders to provide credit relief stood in sharp contrast to the
compulsory behavior government entities expected of the
ordinary citizenry in other respects: there were mandatory
emergency decrees of many sorts including evacuation demands
and mandatory curfews. 13
Creditors complied with the voluntary exhortation to defer
payments and late fees during the initial 90-day period after the
hurricane. They used language suggestive of benevolence rather
than of expedience or of public relations necessity to describe
their deferrals, 4 and they widely advertised and received
http://www.ffiec.gov/press/prl 13005.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). In cases
where principal and interest payments were temporarily deferred, the agency
recommended that at the end of the deferral period "the lender should accord
the account the same payment status it had before the deferral period began.
In such circumstances, loans that were current before Katrina would be
current when the deferral period ended and loans that were past due prior to
the storm would be past due the same number of days they were past due
when the deferral was made."
n Press Release, supra note 10.
12 Id.
13 In a number of cases, tenants were able to secure temporary restraining
orders on evictions when the eviction was based upon rent being in default for
periods where the dwelling was uninhabitable. Trymaine Lee, N.O. Judge
Temporarily Halts Evictions: Lawsuit Says Tenants Need Local Hearings,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 25, 2005, Metro at 1.
14 In many of the affected areas, the displacement of the local population
was to such a degree that oftentimes those employees who would have been
responsible for the preparation of billing statements were unavailable.
2009
Loyola Consumer Law Review
attention in the free media for their decision to waive late fees-
which, they made clear, could legally have been assessed during
the ninety-day period.'" In numerous cases, these deferrals
amounted to sincere gestures of relief. In many cases, however,
early waivers were unavoidable because demands for payment
and assessments of late fees were not feasible in light of the
practical impossibility of sending statements.
Beyond deferring late fees and initial payments, the
policies of the lenders reflected little kindness, benevolence,
charity, empathy, or forgiveness toward consumers, at least in the
ordinary sense of the words. Lenders might have eliminated
interest payment obligations on pre-existing balances for three,
six, or even twelve months, thereby stretching the duration of
open-end (revolving credit) and closed-end loans accordingly.
They might have reduced interest charges during the aftermath
of the hurricane. They might have announced general policies
designed to reduce the anxieties of consumers about adverse
credit reports. They might have collectively convinced the
Federal Reserve Bank to add sufficient liquidity to the system to
increase the availability of consumer credit. But none of these or
similar approaches were employed. 16
Alarmingly and perhaps most economically damaging, of
course, was the underlying and largely underappreciated fact that
the suspension of obligations in the overwhelming number of
cases merely postponed payment obligations with respect to
Significant difficulties also existed in regard to identifying customers'
whereabouts. Furthermore, the postal infrastructure in these areas had been so
compromised that even if the statements could have been prepared for those
whose whereabouts were known, actual delivery would have been impossible.
See David Von Drehle & Jacqueline Salmon, Displacement of Historic
Proportions, WASH. POST,Sept. 2, 2005 at A01 (noting that Hurrican Katrina
created the largest displacement of Americans since the Civil War with over a
half million people relocating after the storm); see also Michelle Hunter,
NEITHER RAIN NOR SLEET?: The Storm Has Passed, the Cleanup is
Under Way and Local Residents Want at Least One Piece of Their Normal,
Pre-Katrina Lives Back: Their Mail, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov.
23, 2005, National at 1 (Following the initial restoration of postal service, mail
oftentimes arrived weeks late).
'1 Whether late fees could have been collected during the first 90 days if
they had not been waived is uncertain. In addition to the bad will that might
have been generated, it is possible that courts might have disallowed late fees
or foreclosure actions immediately after the disaster, based on equitable
principles; it is also possible that the failure to waive such fees would have
elicited regulatory responses.
16 See infra notes and accompanying text.
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principal and interest on loans. The obligations to pay principal
amounts and to pay interest on outstanding balances continued to
run, even during the time they were postponed. 17
For several months, payment obligations were deferred,
and late payment fees were waived, but interest on outstanding
balances and payment of principal were not to be forgiven. The
payments that were due in September, October, and November
continued to accrue regardless of whether they related to
uninhabitable properties, and regardless of whether people lived
in them or were allowed to live in them."8 Thus, for example,
while the grace period ran for home mortgage borrowers, tens of
thousands who were affected faced mounting indebtedness, while
the equity in their houses shrank.
As the three-month "holiday" period came to a close,
lenders began to prepare their borrowers for the impending need
to catch up. Chase Home Finance mailed a letter to customers in
November of 2005 explaining that the "initial moratorium period
on the account.., will be expiring soon," and that it was
"attempting to contact... customers on moratoriums in an effort
to establish a longer term solution for their accounts."' 9
The impact of "moratoria without forgiveness" was to
increase the effective rate of interest on consumer debt. Banks
which offered these deferral periods to their customers typically
acknowledged, but did not highlight, this truth. One sample news
release reads, in pertinent part:
In response to the overwhelming and deepening human
need in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, AmSouth
17 Jody Shen, Prepayment Fees Latest Issue in Gulf, AMERICAN BANKER,
Dec. 23, 2005, Mortgages at 1.
'"As a consequence of these waivers, thousands who should have walked
away from their homes the day after the flood were encouraged by the grace
period, as well as by their traditional commitment to honor their financial
commitments, to agree to make payments and/or incur liability for interest
payments or possibly principal payments as well. See Martha Waggoner, N.C.
Victims of '99 Hurricane Are Still Weathering Woes, WASH. POST, Dec. 27,
2005, at A02 (reporting on misguided encouragement to remain, quoting Jessie
Murphy: "Because had I been thinking right... I probably wouldn't even
have came back here.... Then I got to thinking about how my husband built
this house .... But see, he's not here. I'm the one left with the bills.").
11 Letter from Chase Home Finance to customers (Nov. 14, 2005) (on file
with the author). The letter requested that the borrower contact Chase offices
within 30 days and be "prepared to provide" answers to basic questions
including: "was your property affected" by the hurricanes?; "are you living in
your home?"; and "what is your current employment situation?". Id.
2009
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is automatically deferring consumer and small business
loan payments for up to sixty days for customers in any
county designated for individual assistance by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency... For
residential mortgage loans, customers are asked to
contact 1-800-AmSouth in order to discuss possible
payment extension options. Customers who choose to
make their scheduled payments will have those
payments applied in normal fashion... In all cases,
interest on accounts will continue to accrue and
payments will be applied in the normal fashion
[Emphasis added].2 °
No magic wand mitigated the problems of consumers
within the ninety days of grace. By the time the ninety-day grace
period ended on December 1, 2005, 24.63 percent of all Louisiana
mortgages were behind by at least one payment, compared to 4.4
percent nationally. 21 And although a number of banks - New
Century Financial and Wells Fargo, to name a few - extended
the grace period three months further, most did not.
During and directly after the grace period ended,
displaced homeowners tried to recover on their insurance policies
(both homeowners' and flood insurance policies) in order to meet
their mortgage obligations, but these efforts were impeded by
most insurers whose practices placed mortgagees ahead of
homeowners. Writing in USA TODA Y, Kathy Chu explained in
greater detail the difficulties faced by those who tried to recover
insurance payments with which to rebuild or keep their loan
payments current.22 Typically, insurance companies issued checks
for damaged homes which were made out to the homeowner and
the mortgage company -that provided the loan, and then mailed
the checks to the mortgage company for distribution to the
consumer. The banks and mortgage companies typically released
the funds all at once, or else decided to send them out in
progressive phases.23
20 TheFreeLibrary.com, AmSouth Offers to Automatically Defer
Payments for Customers Severely Impacted by Hurricane Katrina,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/AmSouth+ Offers+to+Automatically+Defer+Pa
yment+for+Customers+Severely. . .- a0135769568 (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
21 Loans in Jeopardy, supra note 6.
22 Kathy Chu, Louisians Attorney General Probes Insurance Check Issues;
Mortgage Companies Involved in Disputes, USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 2005, at 2B.
23 The Insurance Commissioner of Louisiana took pains to explain to
consumers why it was reasonable for insurance companies to issue checks
Vol. 2 2:2
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Contending that they wanted to be sure that funds were
actually used to rebuild the homes they insured, however, more
than a few mortgage lenders delayed mailing out the checks. The
Louisiana Attorney General opened an investigation into
unacceptable delays, and, in particular, began investigating
mortgage lender Countrywide Financial. Countrywide deflected
the blame, however, and attributed its behavior chiefly to high
volumes of claims it had received and faulty computer systems.
During December 2005, the grace period for payments of
principal passed - earlier, in some cases, and later, in others. But
at about this time, mortgage lenders began to issue demands.
Pursuant to their standard form agreements, lenders demanded
that borrowers make up their previous months of missed
payments, including interest and principal for the preceding
months; if they did not, they faced foreclosure. They further
pressed with demands that consumers "cure" their defaults by
catching up with all the previous months during which their
payment obligations had been postponed, along with interest
charges on the principal amount outstanding as of December
(which was larger than it would otherwise have been). The New
Orleans Times-Picayune provided the account of Barbara Smith,
age 67, who in November received a notice at her temporary
living quarters in Kentucky from Green Tree Servicing LLC, her
mortgage company, demanding that she "cure the default" of
$792 on her New Orleans 9 th Ward home mortgage within thirty
days or the company would foreclose and report her to credit
which were made out jointly to lenders: "When you bought the house, you took
out a loan, and as a part of that transaction the lender required that you
purchase an insurance policy to protect the lender's financial interest in your
home as well as your own. Yet many people are taken by surprise when the
insurance payment for damages to their homes was made out to them and the
lender. When you think about it, though, the company holding the mortgage
has to have some way of protecting its financial interests. When you got the
check, you were no doubt concentrating on having your home repaired and
getting on with your life. Your first thought was of getting those repairs done
as quickly and effectively as possible. But the lender has no guarantee that
everyone will act responsibly when paying their bills." United Policy Holders,
Ask Robert Wooley, Your Commissioner of Insurance,
http://www.unitedpolicyholders.org/pdfs/mortgagecompanysettlement.pdf (last
visited Oct. 16, 2009). It should be noted that there are alternative mechanisms
which would provide consumers with incentives to "act responsibly" (however
one interprets that phrase), apart from giving the lender such control, which
the Insurance Commissioner's letter does not consider. The approaches taken
in directives issued in the European Union, for example, generally favor
standard form protections against excessive control by sellers.
.2009
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agencies.24 Upon calling the company, Ms. Smith received a
hostile warning to pay up or lose her house. 21
Major housing lenders behaved somewhat better than
"sub-prime" lenders, but complaints about both flowed into the
office of Louisiana's officials. Government officials indicated that
they were receiving hundreds of complaint letters about banks
requesting huge balloon payments of past-due principal and
interest to bring their mortgage payments up to date.
Of course, the consequence of these payment demands was
to shower misery on those whose lives had already been torn up
by disaster. These demands persisted for several years, with
interest continuing to accumulate, and in tens of thousands of
cases resulting in larger and larger outstanding balances, and
eventually defaults, until foreclosure proceedings were
commenced.26
In a substantial number of cases, weary homeowners were
asked to continue (and catch up on) mortgage payments for
homes that had been demolished. The lump sum demands were,
essentially, forcing many consumers to make payments covering
periods during which their homes were uninhabitable, and they
came at a time when many homeowners had relocated to other
housing to find work or were still not employed.,
In another large set of cases, consumers were encouraged
by mortgage lenders to bring their mortgages current,
notwithstanding the fact that the intrinsic value of their homes
had plummeted so much that their additional payments did not
provide any increased equity in their property. In essence, many
consumers were being encouraged to make payments which
redistributed the economic losses of the hurricane onto
themselves and away from the banks and lenders. Many lenders
thereby avoided the necessity to foreclose on devalued collateral
before they had extracted the maximum possible amount of
" Bill Walsh, More Bad News at a Bad Time: Subprime Lenders Are
Getting Nasty, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 11, 2005, Money at 2.
25 Id.
26 Kirstin Downey, Mortgage Payments Lag in Katrina Zone, WASH.
POST, Mar. 15, 2006 at A03; see also BayouBuzz.com, Louisiana Business
Shorts: New Orleans Recovery, Katrina Lawsuits, Real Estate Foreclosures,
Internet Security, Aug. 6, 2007,
http://www.bayoubuzz.com/News/LouisianaBusiness/LouisianaBusinessSh
ortsNewOrleansRecovery-KatrinaLawsuitsRealEstateForeclosuresI
nternetSecurity 4374.asp (last visited August 27, 2007) (noting that
foreclosure numbers were expected to balloon in areas affected by Hurricane
Katrina).
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revenue possible from homeowners. In hindsight, if these
vulnerable consumers had had access to better information, many
of those who made the payments demanded would not have done
so, and instead would have found it best to simply walk away.
At another extreme, consumers who wanted to pay off
their mortgages using insurance proceeds were charged fees for
doing so that the Attorney General believed were excessive .2 The
consumer group ACORN presented evidence that several lenders
- including Ocwen Financial Corp. and a subsidiary of Bear
Stearns - were assessing large prepayment penalties. 28 Ocwen
- a company which had been investigated and condemned for
predatory lending practices in the past - announced that its
policy was "to issue payoff quotes with all amounts due. . . and
then work with customers who have special circumstances,
especially those affected by natural disasters.
29
Other lenders, including Countrywide Financial Corp.,
Wells Fargo & Co., Citigroup Inc., National City Corp., and
Ameriquest Mortgage Co., told reporters that their "current
policy" was "to waive the penalties if a homeowner pays off the
mortgage on a home hit by the hurricanes with insurance
proceeds. '30 The director of housing counseling for ACORN,
however, suggested that the mainstream banks actually engaged
in the practice of charging payoff fees and then backing off when
challenged.31
The result of the predatory policies pursued by banks and
insurers was personally and economically devastating: citizens
were forced to walk away from their properties because they were
unable to juggle their bills while waiting in temporary homes for
insurance payments - payments which were not even guaranteed
to cover the mortgage(s) on their homes.32 Another unfortunate
result was that people had been induced to make both principal
and interest payments on homes (or wrecks of houses) which were
uninhabitable without major investments; and on properties
whose equity would not have increased regardless of whether
payments were up to date.33
To avoid mortgage foreclosures, debtors have historically
27 Chu, supra note 22, at 2B.
21 Shenn, supra note 17, Mortgages at 1.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Varela, supra note 4, at 1D.
"' See supra.
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resorted to filing petitions in bankruptcy. A large number of
consumers who were hoping to avoid foreclosures through such
judicial safeguards, however, were confronted with a difficult
revelation: bankruptcy was a more difficult path than ever
before.
Shortly before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita landed,
Congress - in what amounted largely to capitulation for
commercial credit card issuers and other banking interests -
passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act.34 Under this legislation, consumer credit card and
installment debt is harder to discharge. Furthermore, bankruptcy
protection is, in general, harder for consumers to obtain. The law
favors creditors at the expense of debtors, particularly poor
consumer debtors. Following Katrina, restrictive measures were
introduced in Congress to delay the implementation of the Act or,
at least, to exclude from its reach those affected by the hurricanes.
None of those bills passed, however.35 Recourse for the
victims of the hurricanes was made less valuable than in previous
calamities. And while proponents of the Act responded to these
concerns by noting that the legislation already contained
provisions for storm victims, in practice these provisions often
could not be utilized by those they were intended to benefit
because the Act put the burden of proof squarely on the debtor.
For individuals whose homes were destroyed along with their
contents, producing the required financial records and funneling
them through a costly legal process was just not possible.36 In the
absence of substantive modification, the Act aggravated the
misfortune of the consumer-debtors who were crippled
financially by the disaster.
There are many anti-consumer-debtor provisions in the
Act, but three changes were particularly damaging for Katrina
victims. One major change from prior law required debtors to
repay at least a portion of their debts over five years if they earn
3" The Act was signed by President Bush on April 20, 2005; most
provisions apply to bankruptcy cases filed after October 17, 2005. See
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
31 See id.
36 Howard Karger, The Financial Storm After the Hurricanes,
ALTERNET, Sept. 29, 2005, available at
http://www.alternet.org/katrina/26089/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
" See Ryan T. Murphy, The Bankruptcy Reform Act: The.Fundamental
Changes For Lenders, NORTHWESTERN FINANCIAL REVIEW, Dec. 15, 2005, at
A2.
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more than the state median income. This provision - in more
than a few instances - compelled the repayment of mortgages on
uninhabitable and worthless land. Another provision essentially
prevented debtors from filing more than one petition per year by
removing in the event of other filings the automatic stay of suits
by creditors. Avoiding foreclosure on homes became more
difficult as a result. Debtors who filed for personal bankruptcy
were also required by the new law to undergo credit counseling
(often funded directly or indirectly by creditors) within six
months before they filed their petition.38 This provided an
additional burden and proved difficult for debtors in the early
months after the storm.
Hoping to get the federal government to address the
mortgage lending crisis, members of the Louisiana Congressional
delegation proposed a massive expenditure program through
which the government would buy back thousands of severely
damaged homes. This plan, however, was never implemented.39
Although extremely popular in the affected region, the proposal
was opposed by the Bush Administration and ultimately never
materialized after it stalled on the Senate floor.40 At the federal
level, this problem was addressed through a senatorial
38 The requirement that a debtor consult with a credit counselor prior to
filing for bankruptcy was temporarily waived in some jurisdictions affected by
Hurricane Katrina. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Trustee
Program Announces Approval of Credit Counseling Agencies for Bankruptcy
Filers and Waiver of Credit Counseling Requirement in Areas Affected By
Hurricane Katrina, Oct. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public-affairs/press/docs/pr20051004.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2009).
39 Editorial, Don't Leave Us to Foreclosure, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Jan. 29, 2006, at 6 (U.S. Rep. Richard Baker is not giving up on his
proposal for a federally backed buyout [at 60 percent of equity based on pre-
Katrina value] of flooded-out homeowners and small business owners. He
wants Congress to create a corporation' that would release Hurricane Katrina's
victims from their mortgages, sell bundles of property to developers and get
storm-ravaged land back into commerce). See also Editorial, What Mr. Powell
Doesn't Get, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 3, 2006, at 6 (contending
that reconstruction czar Powell should get behind Baker's proposal).
40 Bill Walsh, Ball Now in La. Court, Bush Says; State Needs a Plan for
Recovery, He Says TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 27, 2006, National
at 1 (Governor opposed to Bush Administration's opposition to buyout
proposals, noting that White House proposal would only help one in ten
damaged homeowners). See also Stephanie Grace, Forest of Red Tape Leaves
Feds Unmoved, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 8, 2007, Metro-
Editorial at 7 (avoidance of federal bureaucracy, a key talking point in
President Bush's opposition stance, was not accomplished).
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exhortation introduced by Senator Mary Landrieu, D-La.,
"expressing the sense of the Senate that lenders holding
mortgages on homes in communities of the Gulf Coast.. . should
extend current voluntary mortgage payment forbearance periods
and not foreclose on mortgages in those communities. '" 41 Proposals
to permit personal debtors to write down the value of their home
mortgages in bankruptcy proceedings also were rejected after
intense lobbying efforts by the mortgage industry.42
The portrayal above is not intended to demonize mortgage
lenders, most of whom were understandably acting to preserve
the financial viability of their companies and looking after the
interests of their shareholders. Lenders, too, "took a hit" when
Katrina made its landfall.43
Nonetheless, in allocating the costs of Hurricane Katrina
between consumers and lenders, it seems evident that lenders, by
a large margin, gained the upper hand through the enforcement
of standard form contracts, policies, and credit agreements.44
III. Resisting Payment of Claims: The Insurance Companies
I lived in eastern New Orleans and lost everything in
the storm. All of my damage is considered flood
damage, but I didn't have flood insurance. On top of
this, my mortgage company is asking that I make
payments covering the last three months. I don't have
the money to fix my home or even catch up on
payments... Should I let my home go into foreclosure?
And if I do, will I be able to buy a home again in the
near future? Will this situation devastate my credit for
life? 45
41 S. 347, 109th Cong. (2006).
42 See,e.g., Leslie Wayne, Lobbyists for Financial Institutions Swarming
All Over the Bailout Bill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2008 (discussing anti-cram-
down lobbying efforts of Chief of American Banker's Association).
43 Id.
4' Editorial, Sounds like a plan for rebuilding New Orleans, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 2006.
45 Answer Spot, Insurance Company Holds Purse Strings, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 4, 2005, Money at 1.
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I have replacement insurance on my second home in
Bay St. Louis. But my insurance company is holding
back some of my settlement until I show proof that the
work is being done. Is this legal? 46
In 2006, the vice-chair of the Insurance Coverage
Litigation Committee in the Insurance Practice Section of the
American Bar Association Journal predicted that it would "be a
long time coming before people down here will be paid significant
amounts of money for anything besides flood damage. ''47 That
prediction proved largely accurate. Insurers effectively
distinguished "storm" damage (hurricane wind and rain) for
which most homeowners' policies provide coverage, from "flood"
damage, which was excluded under standard form policies. They
further distinguished between damage done to the interior of
homes by rain, wind-driven rain, and rain coming through
openings caused by wind damage and other forces.48
In New Orleans in particular, it proved a challenge for
homeowners to demonstrate that their houses were ruined by the
rain .and wind before they were devastated by the flood waters
which came pouring into the city when the levees gave way.49
The majority of insurance carriers resisted payments in the
absence of such proof.5 0 Oftentimes, insurers relied, on "anti-
concurrent" clauses written into a large portion of policies held in
the area. Essentially, these clauses provided that if any of the
damage was caused concurrently by an "excluded peril" such as
water damage, then the insurer was under no obligation to pay
even if some of the damage was sustained by forces which would
have otherwise been covered. This enforcement became
especially contentious when applied to policies of "slab cases" -
homes that were completely flattened by the storm, but with little
evidence left behind as to whether the damage was caused by
46 Id. (Yes, this is legal).
17 Steve Seidenberg, Insurance: No Sure Thing, 92 A.B.A.J. 51, 51 (2006)
(quoting Mark Daniel Mese, an attorney in Baton Rouge, La.).
48 Regarding the subtle law pertaining to the distinction between wind
and rain damage, see, e.g., Turner Constr. Co. v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 429
F.3d. 52 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2005); this case is discussed on INSURANCE SCRAWL,
Nov. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.insurancescrawl.com/archives/katrina-ritarelated/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2009). See also Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419,
423-42 (5th Cir. Miss. 2007).
49 Id.
" Turner, 29 F.3d at 52.
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water or wind.5"
Intransigence regarding the obligation of insurance
carriers to pay, based on interpretations of their right to
investigate further under standard form contractual agreements,
was by no means limited to New Orleans. In February 2006, the
Cable News Network broadcasted a special documentary report
which focused on the town of Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. The
week prior to Christmas 2005, some four months after Hurricane
Katrina, consumers expressed "betrayal" by their insurance
companies. In fact, some customers had been waiting two to three
months for their insurance adjuster to simply return their phone
calls. As late as February 2006, according to the documentary -
more than a year and a half later - several companies were still
unresponsive to some claims. One report indicated that an older
couple had been offered $16,000 for their home but nothing for
their restaurant, which more than two dozen witnesses saw
destroyed in the wind.52 Under such circumstances, the non-
binding recommendations made by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (BOG), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS),
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to
waive availability restrictions on insurance checks were
unhelpful. 3
s Joe Nocera, Talking Business; A Contract is a Contract, Right?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2007 at C1; see Jay S, Goldblum, Katrina and Beyond:
Judicial Treatment of Boilerplate Language in Standardized Insurance
Contracts, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 453, 461 (2007). ("The emergence of
contracts of adhesion in the insurance industry has left the insured in a
vulnerable position. Knowing that the terms of the contract are standardized
and non-negotiable, the insured rarely reads its terms... The assumption
follows that the insurance company would 'take advantage of the superior
bargaining position to slip in terms ... [that] would not be reasonably expected
by a party to that contract'); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, The Hurricane
Katrina Insurance Claims, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 173 (2007)("Certain
policies not only exclude coverage of loss caused by flood, but also of "waves"
and "tidal water," "whether or not driven by wind." Whether damage from the
storm surge is excluded depends on the meaning both of these policy
provisions and of the anti-concurrent causation clause which precludes
coverage of loss resulting from an excluded cause "regardless of any other
cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss").
52 Kathleen Koch reporting on Bay. St. Louis, Mississippi, (CNN Special
Broadcast, Feb. 2006).
11 Julia S. Cheney & Sherrie L.W. Rhine, How Effective Were the
Financial Safety Nets in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina?, Jan. 2006,
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The routine power of creditors to report delinquencies to
credit reporting agencies gave considerable leverage to home
lenders to demand amounts above insurance payoffs, which had
a negative impact on the size of the payments insurers were
inclined to settle on. A news account told of a younger couple
expecting a child, who made concerted efforts to recover from
Nationwide Insurance for damage done to their house by wind.
Although neighbors on either side had already recovered from
their carriers, Nationwide "stone-walled" them, claiming the need
to investigate further whether the damage was caused by flooding
or, as Nationwide hoped, some other cause not coverable.
"Nationwide is not on our side," the couple bitterly exclaimed.
The young couple did receive some flood settlement from the
federal government, but the payout covered only half of their
damage. Nevertheless, the report indicated, "they keep on paying
on their destroyed home because they can't afford to lose [their]
credit rating. '54
IV. Evictions Without Notice: The Landlords
Do I owe rent on my apartment for the period in August
and September when we were under a mandatory
evacuation order? My apartment wasn't damaged
much, but I couldn't stay there because of the
evacuation order and because there were no utilities.5
Prior to the hurricanes, the housing stock of New Orleans
consisted of approximately 53 percent rentals. Because as much
available at http://www.phil.frb.org/payment-cards-
center/publications/discussion-papers/2006/HurricaneKatrinaJanO6.pdf (last
visited Oct. 23, 2009); see also Jeanne Sahadi, Lenders Lend a Hand to Katrina
Victims, CNN MONEY, Sept. 8, 2005, available at
http:lmoney.cnn.com/2005/09/07/pfkatrina-financial-relief/index.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2009). Other recommendations offered by these agencies
included: waiving ATM fees; increasing daily ATM cash withdrawal limits;
easing restrictions on cashing out-of-state and non-consumer checks; waiving
late fees, overdraft fees, and early withdrawal penalties; allowing loan
customers to skip or defer some payments; easing credit card limits and credit
terms for new loans; and delaying reporting delinquent payments to credit
bureaus. The forgiveness of interest payments was not among their
recommendations.
14 Special Broadcast, supra note 51.
55 The Answer Spot, Handling the Money, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Nov. 6, 2005, Money at 1.
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as one-fifth of that rental stock was destroyed by the hurricanes
in late August, the price of livable housing naturally shot upward.
Katrina knocked out more than 184,000 rental units statewide.56
Landlords were faced with unpleasant choices, most of which led
to the decision to evict tenants. Some re-rented deserted
apartments under lease where tenants had not paid rent. Other
landlords succumbed to the temptation to find technical
justifications for breaking leases with good tenants to extract
higher rents. Others chose to evict tenants so they could make
apartment repairs.
The Mayor asked the city council to consider placing caps on
permissible rental increases, but that did not happen. The
number of eviction notices steadily increased. Instead of
providing renters with a chance to defend themselves from
evictions, landlords throughout the region gave notice only by
tacking eviction papers to doors, "knowing full well that residents
had been scattered by the region's mandatory hurricane
evacuation," and thus, would not see the notice."8
The Governor issued an order on September 6, 2005,
which delayed legal action, including evictions, until September
25, 2005. According to the Times-Picayune, a daily newspaper
published in New Orleans, this was generally greeted as "a
sensible step to prevent confusion and to protect the rights of
parties in lawsuits. '59 Governor Blanco later extended the order
into a moratorium on evictions that would last until October 25,
2005. By this time, it had become very unpopular with landlords
who believed that, given the housing shortage in the city, there
was little reason not to extract high rents, fix buildings up, and
rent out vacant apartments (notwithstanding pre-existing
leases).60
The day after the moratorium ended, constables in the
56 Gwen Filosa, Housing Shortage Hits Labor Market; Working Poor
Mostly Left to Fend for Themselves, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar.
12, 2006, National at 1.
" See, e.g., Mary Swerczek, Kenner Complex Tenants Appeal Eviction
Notices; 'Squatters' in Damaged Units Seek Council's Help, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans) Jan. 21, 2006, Metro at 1.
11 Gwen Filosa, Lawsuit Takes on Post-Storm Evictions; Groups Want
Judge to Rein in Landlords, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 18, 2005,
Metro at 1.
19 Robert Travis Scott & Greg Thomas, Landlords Say Blanco Order
Worsens Housing Shortage; They Can't Evict People Who Aren't Returning,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 15, 2005, Metro at 1.
60 Id.
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New Orleans area served "record numbers of notices telling
tenants to leave."'6' Ten days after the moratorium ended, more
than 700 eviction notices had been filed. As the fall of 2005 gave
way to winter, thousands of tenants were served with judicial
process for eviction hearings.6 It was estimated that 10,000
eviction notices were filed in November alone.63 In housing
complexes across New Orleans, tearful tenants joined forces to
prevent the displacement of their family, friends, and neighbors.64
Landlords seeking eviction were required to serve tenants
at their current addresses, and, if unknown, to ask the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide last known
address information. Eviction proceedings were set for forty-five
days after service of process. Unfortunately, FEMA, which was
ordered in November 2005 to go through its lists to find persons
served with eviction notices, had, by the end of January 2006,
checked only 99 out of 1,000 requested. The result of this
inefficiency was an outcome neither landlords nor tenants wanted
- hearings on hundreds of eviction notices were postponed
indefinitely. 5
When tenants eventually did get to court, they generally
lost. Although many judges were sympathetic to tenants, the law
provided little to no leeway for them if rent payments were not
made.66 One of the few areas where judges could demonstrate
some discretion involved granting an allowance for extra time for
61 Matt Scallan, State's Cease-fire on Evictions Ends; Landlords Flood
Courts; Hearings to Start Next Week, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct.
26, 2005, National at 1; Adam Nossiter, New Orleans Landlords Are Pitted
Against Tenants in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at 20.
62 James Podgers, Siobhan Morrissey, Geri I. Dreiling & G.M. Filisko,
Real Estate: The Clock is Ticking, 92 A.B.A.J. 50, 50, (2006).
63 Gwen Filosa & Michelle Hunter, Rental Quandary, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Dec. 12, 2005, National at 1.
64 Filosa, supra note 57.
65 Susan Finch, Court: FEMA Reply Comes Up Short; It Seeks Addresses
in Eviction Lawsuits, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 21, 2006, Metro
at 1; see also Bill Barrow, N.O. Leadership Lacking, Report Says; Housing
Shortage Also Hindering Recovery, It Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Apr. 25, 2007, National at 2 (progress was hindered because demand for labor
outstrips supply, largely due to a lack of affordable housing); see also Bruce
Eggler, Proposal to Limit New Housing Dropped; Moratorium on Apartments
Forsaken, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), March 16, 2007, National at 1
(displaced residents unable to return due to high cost of rent and alleged plans
for gentrification).
66 Real Estate: The Clock is Ticking, supra note 61.
2009
Loyola Consumer Law Review
now-evicted tenants to go in and retake their possessions."
Perhaps more devastating, state and local laws allowed eviction
without cause for those on month-to-month leases, or in cases
where the landlord claimed the dwelling was destroyed. 68 "It's
terrible," a lawyer was quoted as saying. "Louisiana law is so
favorable to landlords that tenants really have no recourse if they
do not have a term lease."6 9
A measure that passed the Louisiana House of
Representatives on November 9 after the storm would have
permitted a landlord to evict tenants who left under mandatory
evacuation and hadn't made rent payments for the time they
were to be away. The Washington Post interviewed an associate
professor at Tulane who referred to the legislation as a "landlord
immunity bill."70 And yet the New York Times reported that
housing experts were saying that many landlords were not trying
to gouge. "It's a real conundrum," said a spokesman for the
Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center. "The
landlords make their money off renters, and renters, not
unreasonably, object to paying rent when they are not even
there."7
67 Id.
68 Josh P. Hamilton, Housing Shortage Is Slowing Down Louisiana
Recovery; Soaring Rents Drive Out Residents, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2005, at
F3 7.
69 See Rental Quandary, supra note 62.
70 Hamilton, supra note 67.
71 Adam Nossiter, New Orleans Landlords Are Pitted Against Tenants in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at 20; see also Shaila Dewan, Road to New
Life After Katrina Is Closed to Many, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007 (Low income
tenants, comprising the majority of evictees, will find returning to their homes
difficult due to doubling and tripling of rents; only 21% of the 77,000 rental
units in the five parishes of New Orleans are slated to be rebuilt through
government grants and tax credits while HUD goes forward with plans to
demolish 3,000 lower-income apartments and replace them with units that
cater to middle income families); Two years after Katrina devastated the Gulf
Coast, renters are left with few options to resettle in their former communities.
Furthermore, funding programs set aside to benefit renters are few and far
between. Landlords who own from one to four rental units can tap into $869
million in public funding, which pales in comparison to the $7.5 billion
devoted to owners of damaged homes. Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod & Olympia
Duhart, Evaluating Katrina: A Snapshot of Renters' Rights Following
Disasters, 31 NOVA L. REV. 467,484 (2007).
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V. Price Increases and Power Usage: The Electric Utility
Providers
The difficulties which faced utility companies after the
September hurricanes were immense-almost as immense as
those which faced each of the thousands of individual consumers
as they tried to put their lives back together in the wake of the
storms. In Mississippi, the Mississippi Power Company lost
electric service to all of its 195,000 customers and suffered
extensive damage to its facilities. The company's workers spent
day and night trying to rebuild lines and reconnect customers. 2
Nearly 65 percent of the company's transmission and distribution
facilities needed to be replaced or repaired.
Customers were generally treated with care, especially
during the initial period. During the storm and its immediate
aftermath, the company suspended all meter readings, both due
to a shortage of manpower and also because of a desire to give its
customers a breathing spell. But soon afterward, by mid-
September, the company began reading meters again and sought
to return to its normal billing schedules. The company waived
many of its normal fees, including connection fees, late fees, and
deposits. But when the company was not able to read a meter (for
example, when a house had been totally destroyed) it nonetheless
endeavored to "estimate a customer's usage in order to determine
the bills" for September and October. "We estimated a customer's
usage based on their historical patterns. If that's the case the next
month's bill will make up for any difference-of course,
customers are charged only for the electricity they use. 7 To
72 The Mississippi Power Company is a subsidiary of the Southern
Company. See Mississippi Power Customer Information,
http://newsinfo.southernco.com.
73 In Louisiana, the Entergy Corporation, serving more than a million
customers in 58 parishes, faced problems of a comparable magnitude. The
company tried to return to the normal billing process as soon as possible. It
took a different approach to meter reading, however. As of March 2, 2006, the
company's website stated that for areas significantly affected by Katrina, the
company's estimates would assume no usage for the period after August 29,
and for Rita, no usage would be assumed after September 24, 2005. On its
Frequently Asked Questions web page, in answer to the question, "Will my
service be interrupted if I do not make another payment," the company
replied: "Any subsequent bills you receive would show the amount in question
as a previous balance if payment has not been delivered by the Postal Service.
However, we would mail you a late notice, sometimes called a disconnect
notice, before your service is ever interrupted." http://www.entergy-
louisiana.com/faq/katrinarita.aspx (last visited July 17, 2007). Entergy also
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apply historical September figures as post-hurricane September
figures amounted to significant initial overbilling.
By November, the Company had initiated further steps to
regain its economic footing. It made "fuel adjustment" rate
increase filings to account for the increase in price of both natural
gas and coal. To reflect these increases, the company raised its
prices by 10 percent.
At roughly the same time, the Mississippi Power Company
announced to its shareholders on January 26, 2006, that its
returns for the preceding year not only met expectations, but
exceeded them. The company reported that its pro forma 2005
earnings were $1.5 billion, or $2.14 per share - higher than the
previous year and in excess of analysts' expectations. The CEO,
David Ratcliffe, said that the performance was strong because the
company delivered "outstanding results" to its customers. 4 At the
same time, it posted on its website a notice to consumers which
suggested that it would not automatically provide any relief to
hurricane victims but would ask for a demonstration of hardship:
If you are' experiencing financial hardship and are
unable to pay the full amount of your bill by the due
date, it may be possible to extend your payment date
beyond the current due date. Not all customers are
eligible for payment arrangements. If you proceed, we
operates in Mississippi. It estimated the average bill for a customer would in
2006 be 18 percent higher for the same amount of electricity than it was in
2005: http://www.entergy-mississippi.com/features/02_06.aspx (last visited Oct.
30, 2007). Entergy later resumed normal billing operations, notifying
customers that they would be billed for their actual energy consumption. In
regard to those who were still unable to receive service, but still had active
accounts, a "minimum bill" of $8.00 for residential electric service and $7.00
for residential gas service was to be issued, notwithstanding the non-delivery
of any actual services. Additional fees were levied against customers with
commercial or other non-residential accounts, Letter from Entergy to
customers (Jan. 2005). Entergy's stock price rose substantially in each year
between 2005 and 2008.
71 Southern Company Reports Solid Fourth Quarter Earnings; Strong
Economy in Region Helps Drive 2005 Results, available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/SO/0x0x79570/7c 24967-9e49-44b0-
aae8-d2f3f7afe130/185477.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2009). In the time
following this report, Southern Company has continued to do well for itself,
notwithstanding economic difficulties precipitated by the sub-prime crisis. See
Southern Company Reports Solid 2008 Earnings Despite Weak Economy,
Mild Weather,
http://investor.southerncompany.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=361845 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009).
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will review your account to determine if you are
eligible.75
As of February 2006-half a year after the hurricane-
Mississippi Power reported that 20,217 customers, or 10.38
percent of its pre-Katrina residential clientele, were still
disconnected from the company's power grid.
76
VI. Preserving Recurring Charges: Cable and Internet Services
Cox Communications, a giant national media
conglomerate and the largest provider of cable, broadband, and
internet phone service in New Orleans, faced a large number of
problems related to the disruption of its services in affected areas.
Customers whose homes were uninhabitable, customers who left
the region, and customers who moved into temporary housing
could no longer use Cox services, either at their old or their new
residences. As it was, cable connections were down throughout
the area.
Soon after the hurricane struck, the company developed
an action plan, which it referred to as a plan for "hurricane
transition."77 Under the plan, customers who learned about the
plan could, for a "reduced monthly rate," suspend their services.
If these same customers found temporary housing through
FEMA or otherwise, Cox charged $12.50 to send technicians to
relocate their prior cable service. Practical problems connected
with service interruptions and customers moving from one
location to another abounded. For example:
Q: My house is being rebuilt and I want to leave my
phone on in my house but transfer my other services
to my new apartment.
7 Southern Company website, available at
http://customerservice.southerncompany.com/PmtArrangementlPmtArrangem
entintro.aspx (last visited June 13, 2007).
76 Id. According to a media relations spokesperson for the Southern
Company, full power was restored 12 days after the storm for "anyone in a
position to utilize it." The figure of "20,217 disconnected" represented, the
company maintained, customers whose homes were damaged to the point
where power could not safely be connected. As of Oct. 6, 2007, 15,269 (7.84%
of pre-Katrina clientele) were still unable to take power (telephone interview
with Southern Company media relations, Oct. 18, 2007).
" Cox Communications, available at http://www.cox.com/louisianal
hurricaneupdate.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
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A: Unfortunately, we can only transfer all or none at
this time.7"
Although the company stated that it would not bill
customers for their suspended service until it was restored,79 there
were many problems. Complaints of slow recovery and wrongful
charges were not exceptional. 0 Cox found itself warning
customers that if they did not plan on returning to New Orleans,
they should contact the company "in order for you to avoid being
charged for services you are NOT utilizing.""
Along with every other consumer creditor, Cox charged
interest on balances that were outstanding at the time of the
storm for the continuous period thereafter; and, as the balances
grew, interest charges were compounded. As the financial impact
of the storm, including the impact of its own service charges,
began to affect demand, the company announced that it would
not change the price for its standard cable service for customers.
Cox also established a visible philanthropic presence. It
donated more than $1.6 million to the Red Cross, United Way,
Boys & Girls Clubs of America, and Habitat for Humanity as
part of its efforts to rebuild the stricken community. It also took
advantage of the need for widespread repairs in the area to
upgrade its systems.
VII. Rate Hikes and the Protection of Investor Returns:
Telephone and Wireless Communication Companies
BellSouth, the dominant supplier of landline telephone
services in Louisiana, faced immense problems in reconstructing
78 Cox Communications, available at http://www.cox.com/louisianaJ
damaged.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
" Cox Communications, available at http://www.cox.com/louisiana/
damaged.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
80 See, e.g., Cox Cable Comes Back Quickly For Many, ST. CHARLES
HERALD, Sept. 11, 2008, available at
http://www.heraldguide.com/details-archive.php?id=4628 (comparison of 2008
favorable to Katrina).
81 Cox Communications, available at
http://www.cox.com/louisianaftrailer.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
82 Linda Moss, Putting a Perfect Storm Behind Them; After Katrina, Cox's
Louisiana Systems Faced Recovery and Consolidation in 2006,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Feb. 19, 2007, at 18; available at
http://www.multichannel.com/article/127922-
Putting-aPerfectStormBehindThem.php.
Vol. 22:2
Thriving on Adversity
the phone system. The company stated that it had lost 810,000
lines, or one-sixth of its lines in its service area. To put this figure
in context, more than 1.75 million lines were affected by the
storm.83 BellSouth implemented a disaster relief plan and issued
scores of news releases as soon as it became apparent that a
significant storm was approaching. The company estimated
repair costs of between $700 million to $900 million. BellSouth
took advantage of this need for repairs; instead of merely
replacing lines, the company upgraded most of its lines and
generally modernized its equipment.
In the immediate aftermath of the storm, wireless cellular
phone companies provided relief to customers. Sprint Nextel
issued free credits for monthly service to customers directly
impacted by the hurricane. The company offered free long-
distance calling, and also waived roaming, text messaging, and
overage charges.84  Cingular similarly waived charges for
roaming, extra minutes, long distance and texting, and provided a
one-time 50% credit on monthly fees to customers in the affected
areas. T-Mobile, too, relaxed its service charges, and offered free
wireless internet (Wi-Fi) hotspots in affected areas.8 5 BellSouth
waived a number of fees and attempted to help consumers handle
problems related to the restoration of service; the company also
made arrangements to extend the time for payment in many
cases. 6 Nonetheless, thousands of BellSouth customers became
embittered by their experience with the company as time passed
and their payments became due while service, on the other hand,
did not return to pre-hurricane conditions.
As was the case with providers of other essential services,
83 Jim Duffy, Katrina Could Cost BellSouth $600 Million, NETWORK
WORLD, Sept. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/090605-bellsouth-katrina.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2009).
84 Business Wire, Sprint Nextel Implements Pricing and Billing Relief
Plan for Customers Impacted by Hurricane Katrina; Network Restoration
Efforts Continue, Sept. 7, 2005, available at
http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/23333 I/sprint nextel implement-pr
icingand-billingrelief plan for-customers (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
85 The Internet Portal, T-Mobile Provides Free Wifi to Hurricane
Katrina's Victims, Aug. 30, 2005, available at
http://www.theinternetpatrol.com/t-mobile-provides-free-wifi-to-hurricane-
katrinas-victimsf (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
86 See AT&T Newsroom, available at
http://att.centralcast.netBellSouthNewsArchive/Release.aspx?ID=4309 (last
visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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waivers of penalties for nonpayment (or even late payment) were
beyond the scope of telephone and wireless company generosity.
Balances on accounts that existed prior to the storm continued to
accrue interest throughout the storm and its aftermath; there is no
evidence that these interest accruals were reduced or written
down on any routine basis.87
As service providers began to notice that many residents
were not returning to the affected areas, feelings emerged within
the industry that a complete restoration of networks to full pre-
Katrina capacity might not be financially or economically viable.
An industry insider, on condition of anonymidty, observed that the
phone company might "cover New Orleans with 50 cell sites
instead of 200."88
In terms of its own economic performance, and despite the
costs incurred, BellSouth recovered quickly from the hurricane,
partly due to new DSL operations and its proportionate share of
Cingular Wireless. 9 In January 2006, BellSouth reported that its
consolidated revenue from continuing operations edged up to $5.2
billion, while net income from continuing operations rose by more
than 33 percent.
VIII. Interest Postponed but Not Forgiven: The Credit Card
Issuers
After the hurricane, standard credit card agreements
permitted issuers wide latitude in determining the degree to
which they could waive or suspend interest payments on pre-
existing balances or post-hurricane card use. Nothing in the
standard form agreement provided cardholders any exceptional
payment terms or modification rights that would be triggered in
the event of a natural disaster.9 ° Representative of this rule in
87 Telecom Digest Online, Cingular, Sprint, Others Give Hurricane
Victims Phone Bill Help, Sept. 10, 2005, available at
http://massis.lcs.mit.edu/telecom-archives/TELECOM Digest-Online2005-
2/1498.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
88 Mark Rockwell, Retrenching After Katrina; Carriers Take a Crash
Course on Security and Scale After the Storm. (AFTER THE STORM: TIER
1 CARRIERS), WIRELESS WEEK, Oct. 1, 2005 at 11.
89 CedMargazine.com, BellSouth Reports Healthy DSL, DBS Gains in
Q4, Jan. 25, 2006, available at http://www.cedmagazine.com/toc-bbdirect/2006
(last visited Oct. 20, 2009); 2005 BellSouth Annual Report,
http://www.ticker.com/annualreport/bls/bls-2005.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2009).
' See infra.
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standard card agreements was a default provision in a VISA
agreement, which, upon any delinquency, entitled the issuer to
immediately demand not only interest but the full balance of
indebtedness:
If you are in default, we have the right to demand
immediate payment of your full Account Balance at
once without notice to you... In the event of a default,
you agree to pay all costs of collecting the amount you
owe under this agreement including, if the unpaid
balance under this plan is greater than Three Hundred
Dollars ($300) at the time of collection, reasonable
attorney's fees if the debt is referred for collection to an
attorney who is not our employee and if suit is filed,
court costs.9"
The consequence of such unyielding default provisions
was to leave to unbridled creditor discretion the exercise of
leniency or forgiveness.9" Indeed, the "business as usual"
approach was not unheard of in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. In a perspective column echoing the plight of numerous
displaced storm victims, Michael Allweis, a New Orleans
attorney, provided the following account:
Yesterday I made calls to ask for some delay on behalf
of our employees, but I was turned down flat. Despite
the circumstances, credit card companies insisted upon
payment and, on at least two separate occasions,
confirmed that accounts will continue to accrue interest
91 Family Security Credit Union, Visa Credit Card Agreement, available
at http://www.myfcsu.com/VISAapplication.pdf.
92 While the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency noted that credit
card lenders had latitude to work with borrowers in affected areas through,
among other things, lowered interest rates (they did not suggest forgiving
interest), such suggestions had no binding effect. See News Release,
Comptroller of the Currency, (last updated Mar. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.occ.gov/HurricaneQA.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). In light of
the encouragement offered by this and other governmental entities, the
Louisiana Office of Financial Institutions explicitly highlighted that credit
modifications, restructuring, and extensions given by financial institutions to
hurricane victims would not be necessarily, indicative of imprudent lending
practices by regulatory agencies. See Bulletin BL-01-2006, Office of Financial
Institutions, Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www.ofi.louisiana.gov/BL-01-
2006-supervisory% 20guidance%20for%20hurricane%20katrina2 .pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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and that they will charge fees for late payment. In the
face of this overwhelming tragedy, which has left over
one million people with uncertain futures, such a
position is scandalous.93
This approach also rang true in the case of Discover,
which sent the following e-mail to its cardholders couched with
the words "Hurricane Relief Information" in the subject line:
I'm very sorry to hear about the recent disaster that
affected your community. Please know that Discover
Card is here to help you through this difficult time.
We can assist you with locating ATMs, issue emergency
PINs to access cash, and provide
additional/replacement cards for immediate use. You
can also view your statement summary online and make
an immediate payment or schedule a payment in
advance - whenever it's most convenient for you. We
also have additional services for qualified accounts that
may be helpful.
Thanks for being a Discover Cardmember. If there is
anything we can do to serve you better, please let us
know. Knowledgeable Account Managers are available
to assist you 24 hours a day, 7 days a week at 1-888-668-
8767, or you can always visit Discover.com 4
Magnanimity varied according to a consumers' previous
business relationship with an issuer. 5 For instance, holders of
" Jason Spitalnnik, Guest Post: The Financial Impact of Hurricane
Katrina, TPMCAFE, Sept. 2, 2005, available at
http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2005/09/02/guest-post-the-financial_i
mpac/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
94 JLP, Discover Card's Idea of "Hurricane Relief',
ALLFINANCIALMATTERS, Sept. 18, 2008, available at
http://allfinancialmatters.com/2008/09/18/discover-cards-idea-of-hurricane-
relief/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
" NCUA, Hurricane Katrina Relief: Whpt is NCUA doing to provide
regulatory relief and forbearance for federally insured credit unions impacted
by Hurrican Katrina, available at
http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/Hurricane/Katrina/Relief.aspx (Noting a joint
ruling by the National Credit Union Association (NCUA) and various banking
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BellSouth's ordinary MasterCard were allowed to skip a month's
worth of payments. Their treatment by the company, however,
did not compare with the treatment of holders of the BellSouth
Platinum MasterCard and the BellSouth Platinum Business
MasterCard. All calls from these customers were directly
transferred to Chase customer service teams "with special
training to assist hurricane victims."96 Thus, the "best" BellSouth
MasterCard customers were afforded the following benefits:
"emergency credit line increases; removal of minimum payment
requirements; courtesy fee waivers; overnight emergency card
replacements in areas where either the USPS or UPS can deliver;
and Telephone authorization of charges without cards at point of
purchase, or. . .cash advances at any participating banks. 9 7
These preferred MasterCard holders could defer payments for 50
days, and also received waivers of late and over-limit fees for an
unspecified period of time. Most significantly, none of their
accounts would be reported to credit bureaus as delinquent, and
delinquencies would be removed on accounts that were not
originally identified as platinum accounts.98 Such privileges,
however, were not conferred upon all of Chase's customers.
Some banks behaved in a more egalitarian fashion than
others. Regions Bank, for example, appears to have adopted a
common approach for all customers. Immediately following the
storm, Regions noted in a news release that it was:
[S]howing its support for the communities impacted. by
Hurricane Katrina by offering special services to the
residents and customers in those emergency relief areas.
The bank has waived ATM and check-cashing fees for
residents and customers in the affected area, and
Regions Bank customers in those same impacted areas
can defer some loan and credit card payments, increase
credit limits on credit cards and get special discounts
agencies regulating FDIC insured institutions allowed federal credit unions
discretion to allow their customers to "skip" or "defer" some payments) (last.
visited'Oct. 20, 2009).
96 BellSouth Platinum MasterCard Users,
http://www.bellsouth.com/residential/hurricaneMC.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2009).
97 Id.
9 Burney Simpson, Issuers Cut Consumers Slack, For Now, CARDS &
PAYMENTS, Nov. 1, 2005 at 32, available at
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi-O198-1706 70/Payments-on-hold-Katrina-
floods.html.
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and introductory rates on new equity loans and lines of
credit.99
Variations on the theme of Regions' payment deferral
option were offered by other issuers as well. Both Providian and
Citibank suspended payment of principal, interest, and fees for
thirty days to those located within. FEMA's declared disaster
zones. The consumer finance arm of General Electric (responsible
for numerous store brand credit cards) waived fees and froze
penalties and charges to those in the affected areas on a similar
schedule. In most of the cases studied, however, even if late
charges were waived and payment obligations were suspended
until December of the following year, interest charges on pre-
existing balances nevertheless continued to accrue - not to
mention the charges that also mounted from card use necessitated
during the emergency period.'00
However, not all lenders were predatory in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina. The-Army and Air Force Exchange Service
(AAFES), an organization that provides goods and services of
necessity and convenience to members of the armed forces, stood
in strong contrast to other consumer finance lenders for its
sensible and fair treatment of borrowers. Most notably, AAFES
announced its intention to waive interest and suspend monthly
Regions, News Release, available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=65036&p=irol-newsArticle&ID= 751298&highlight=
(last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
100 A characteristic message contained in credit card mailing statements
read: "Due to Hurricane Katrina, we have granted you a payment. holiday for
your next payment. Your account will not be reported as late and will not
receive a late fee, but finance charges will accrue." MasterCard Statement
from Hibernia to a New Orleans Customer (Sept. 5, 2005) (on file with author).
In regards to payment deferral, a typical letter from a bank read: "All other
terms of your account remain unchanged. At the end of the deferral period, all
required minimum monthly payments will resume and the finance charge
waiver will expire. Any arrearage or payments due on your account prior to
this four month deferral program will be due and payable in January 2006."
Letter from AIG Bank to a New Orleans Customer (Sept. 28, 2005) (on file
with author). Some additional variations include Bank of America's waiver of
late fees, over limit fees and finance charges; American Express's "special
procedures for impacted Cardmembers to address additional spending needs,
delayed payments and associated fees;" Capital One's waiver of fees and
deferred interest; Chase and Bank One's minimum 30-day payment deferral
and waiver of late fees together with their 90-day grace period on negative
credit reporting; MBNA's waiver of late fees; and Wells Fargo's 90-day
payment deferral and late fee waiver. Company Policies for Katrina Victims
http://clarkhoward.com/topics/katrina-policies.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
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payment requirements to its cardholders displaced by Hurricane
Katrina, with this suspension applying to both old and new
purchases.01 It is the only such lender uncovered by this study.
IX. Protecting Dealerships Before Borrowers: The Automobile
Finance Companies
The story of how consumers fared at the hands of auto
lenders closely resembles the story of how consumers fared at the
hands of mortgage lenders. Tens of thousands of automobiles
were damaged or lost entirely as a result of the hurricanes. In a
fleeting act of empathy, General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC) offered an extension of up to ninety days after the
disaster for customers who wished to defer their loan payments. 102
GMAC offered to waive late fees during this period. At the end of
the 90-day period, however, GMAC began to once again charge
interest on the accumulated principal, and subsequently began to
assess late fees.
Ford Credit customers were given the opportunity to defer
''up to two vehicle payments without paying extension fees"
under the company's Disaster Relief Program. In order to receive
this grace, customers were required to register within sixty days,
and were told that the amount of the deferred payments was "due
at the end of the term," indicating that Ford would not permit
customers to carry forward balances attributable to the grace
period.103
DaimlerChrysler's charitable fund donated more than $1.1
million to Katrina relief, but its policy toward its debtors was less
magnanimous. In an indication that DaimlerChrysler Financial
Services may have been more immediately concerned about the
economic well-being of its dealers than its customers, its financial
101 U.S. Dep't of Defense, AAFES Waives Interest, Suspends Payments for
Katrina Victims, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17407 (last visited Oct.
20, 2009).
12 Personal banking help for hurricane victims,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9146146 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). See also
Hurricane Katrina is Over, THE NEW YORKER, MAY 7, 2007, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/neworleansjournal/2007/05/hurricane_
katri.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (Hurricane victim facing automobile
repossession due to an inability to pay her final $437 payment discusses plight
with GMAC collections agent; she is ultimately told that "GMAC has
determined that Hurricane Katrina is over").
103 Id.
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services division sent a crisis team to help its dealers affected by
the storm, but told hurricane. victims to call a toll-free number if
they wished to work out a payment plan."°4 It announced that
special circumstances payment extensions and deferrals for
customers were available, but only up to ninety days.105 Defaults
and repossessions of cars in the region spiked after the deferral
period ended and continued to severely increase in the Katrina-
affected states for years after the storm. 106
In the months following the hurricane, many consumers
were forced to purchase cars because of the very large number of
vehicles that were destroyed or washed out in the New Orleans
and Houston-Galveston markets. In the aftermath of the storm,
however, thousands of consumers were bumped down. into lower
credit categories as a result of both negative credit reports and
indications of lost housing and unemployment. In addition, so
many people were priced out of the new car market that it
became necessary for them to resort to sub-prime lending to
support their used car purchases. The result was a boom "in used-
car sales, nonprime financing, and, accordingly, buy-here-pay-
here operations."10 7 The significant consequence of such higher-
cost borrowing and restricted shopping alternatives was to place
already-burdened consumers into further financial jeopardy.
X. Short Term Relief: The Response by FEMA and Federal
Agencies
The extent to which the relief agencies of the federal
government responded promptly and efficiently to appeals for
assistance immediately after the storm has received nearly
104 Id.
' Id. See also DaimlerChrysler Commits $1.1 Million to Hurricane
Katrina Humanitarian Efforts, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT= 104&STORY =/www/story/o9-01-
2005/0004098814&EDATE= (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
106 See Liz Opsitnik, Transunion.com: Auto Debt Up, Highest in Heavy
Populations, http://www.autoloandaily.com/loan-news/auto-loan-dail/52-
transunioincom-auto-debt-up-highest-in-heavy-populations (May 16,
2008)(Quoting Ezra Becker, a principal consultant in Transunion's financial
service group: "From a risk perspective, auto loan delinquency seems to mirror
the continued economic downturn that has plagued southeastern states like
Louisiana and Mississippi in the long wake of Hurricane Katrina, and has
been indirectly exacerbated by the continuing riiortgage crisis").
107 See Mac Gordon, Subprime Is Growing, WARD'S DEALER BUSINESS,
Nov. 1, 2005, at 20, available at
http://wardsdealer.com/ar/autosubprime__growingl (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
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universal attention. For the purposes of this study, however, it is
noteworthy that virtually all of the FEMA relief focused away
from consumer issues. Helping consumers address their credit
problems was, at best, a secondary or indirect concern.
Understanding FEMA's historical mission makes this
point evident. In 1979, President Carter issued an executive order
which merged the separate disaster -related responsibilities of the
Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention
and Control Administration, the National Weather Service
Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness
Agency of the General Services Administration, the Federal
Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD, and the
Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness'
responsibilities, into what became FEMA. 108 FEMA developed
an "all-hazards approach" to catastrophe relief, with systems of
assistance "common to the full range of emergencies from small
isolated events to the ultimate emergency - war."10 9 More than
three decades later, federal disaster relief efforts have been
streamlined to meet the immediate survival needs of persons
whose lives are disrupted by natural and man-made catastrophes.
FEMA's central mission has been efficient hurricane relief and
the provision of temporary food and housing during
emergencies.110
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA, as deployed,
stood true to this mission. Disaster unemployment assistance was
activated. Emergency supplies of food and water were
distributed. Checks in amounts of approximately $2,300 were
provided to individual victims for their immediate food and
shelter needs. FEMA even offered some crisis counseling.
Congress enacted special legislation, the "American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009," which provided
Mississippi with $14.3 million and Louisiana with $26.1 million
for the Homelessness Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing
program."1 The Recovery Act assisted families by providing
108 Exec. Order No. 12127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19367 (Mar. 31, 1979), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12127.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
109 See Generally FEMA History,
http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm (last modified May 29, 2009)
(providing a description of FEMA's origins and history).
110 See Finding Long-Term Housing Solutions for Hurrican Victims,
http://www.fema.gov/medialfactsheetlongterm-housing-hurr
(last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
"I American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11-4,
Title XII, 123 Stat. 221-22 (2009).
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rental assistance, security deposits, and additional services. 112
This assistance prevented immediate defaults and kept some
families housed, but it failed to address consumer debt.
Furthermore, there were many limitations on the size and
types of consumer assistance that would be provided by FEMA.
For instance, FEMA would not pay evacuation hotel bills which
exceeded the one-time general assistance checks. Funds were
advanced for minor home repairs, but seldom for major ones.
FEMA provided money for medical expenses directly incurred
due to the hurricane but not for those indirectly incurred. There
was some limited assistance for car repairs, but not for the
purchase of cars. FEMA's help with mortgage payments lasted
only a few months at best."3
Housing was the primary focus of FEMA's intermediate-
term relief efforts.'14 Approximately 276,000 families filed
applications for low-interest government loans in order to rebuild
their homes and their lives."' In the months after the storm,
however, there was insufficient government assistance to enable
many victims to rebuild their homes. More than three months
after Hurricane Katrina, the Small Business Administration,
which ran the government's disaster recovery program for
homeowners, had only processed one-third of applications.11 6
More distressingly, at one point, the government rejected 82
percent of applications (more than 77,000), a higher percentage
than in previous disasters.'ilAccording to the New York Times, a
principal reason for this high rejection rate was that the
creditworthiness standards applied by the government had not
been adjusted to account for the large number of low-income
12 See Finding Long-Term Housing Solutions, supra note 108.
13 See Press Release, Secretary Napolitano Announces $100 Million in
ARRA Funds for Emergency Food and Shelter Program (April 9, 2009),
available at http;//www.dhs.gov/ynews/releaseslpr-1239302787726.shtm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009).
See Finding Long-Term Housing Solutions, supra note 108.
H" Leslie Eaton & Ron Nixon, Federal Loans to Homeowners Along Gulf
Lag, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005 at Al.
"6 Id. It was not until mid-2006 that the brunt of the remaining two-
thirds of loan applications had been processed. See Press Release, U.S. Small
Business Administration, SBA Recovrey Loans for Gulf Coast Residents
Surpass $10 Billion (June 20 2006), available at
http://www.sba.gov/news/pressmain/index.html (follow "Year 2006" hyperlink;
then open newsarch_2006.zip; then open 2006'06-20) (last visited Oct. 21,
2009).
117 Eaton & Nixon, supra note 113..
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individuals affected by the disasters."'
The Times provided as an illustration the case of Albertha
Hastens, a 55 year-old member of the school board in White
Castle, Louisiana, who lived principally on social security
payments. Strong winds damaged the roof and side of her house,
but the Small Business Administration turned down her request
for a loan, citing her low income." 9 "It makes you tired and
disgusted," Ms. Hastings was quoted as saying. "For poor
working people, you don't know what to do."'2 °
It is well-reported that FEMA horribly mishandled many
aspects of the immediate and long-term delivery of services and
essential supplies to storm victims, particularly in New
Orleans."' Explanations of the many failures are largely
attributed to incompetence, negligence, cronyism, and possibly
racism; indeed, the Hurricane Katrina relief effort has been
characterized as a humanly-caused disaster that compounded a
natural one. 2 In the four years after Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita struck in 2005, FEMA has struggled to provide Gulf Coast
households with temporary housing assistance, such as trailers or
manufactured housing. In 2009, FEMA finally reported that its
temporary program had ended, and that 139,000 households had
been moved from temporary units into long-term housing. 3
Even if these humanly-caused administrative failures had
not occurred, the relief provided by FEMA during and after
Hurricane Katrina was, as indicated, institutionally limited and
largely irrelevant to the consumer debt issues discussed above. As
one FEMA official recently put it, "federal assistance is not
designed to make someone whole again ... federal disaster
assistance is designed by Congress to be a helping hand, to be a
leg up to help people get back on the road to recovery."'24 "It's not
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. There have also been other possibilities for actual or proposed
assistance. See, e.g., Editorial, Big Oil Can Share its Big Profits, DES MOINES
REGISTER, Nov. 5, 2005, at A12 (proposal to supplement fuel programs for
Hurricane victims using excess oil company profits).
121 See, e.g., Kevin Drum, FEMA's Failures, WASHINGTON MONTHLY,
Sept. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2005_09/007104.php
(last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
122 See Dan Farber & Jim Chen, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND
BEYOND (2006); Douglas Brinkley, THE GREAT DELUGE (2007).
123 See Finding Long-Term Housing, supra note 108.
124 See Meg Farris, Meg Farris Explains FEMA Assistance Program,
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designed to make someone like they were before the disaster. 1 2
Certainly, there was no government program designed to help
consumers reduce their consumer debt or defray the growth of
carrying charges that consumers paid to merchants and lenders
while they were forced out of their homes and away from their
jobs.
XI. The Aggregate Impact On Consumer Default: Bankruptcy and
Personal Hardship
As low and moderate-income consumers faced mounting
demands by mainstream lenders and service providers (especially
in regard to catch-up payments and increased interest charges),
and as consumers were further scarred by bad credit ratings
connected with late payments and defaults, it was inevitable that
many more consumers would turn to alternative financial
markets, markets where the contract terms were even harsher
and rates more expensive. 12 6 Mainstream banks and mortgage
lenders stopped lending to many low and moderate-income
consumers because of defaults (defaults which the banks and
lenders partially precipitated). 7
Soon after the New Orleans levees were breached, Fair
Isaac Corp. (FICO) was approached by six major consumer
organizations who sought a modification in its credit scoring
model. 2 ' Their proposal was to include a table of "pre-disaster
WWL-TV, Sept. 5, 2008, available at
http://www.wwltv.com/topstories/stories/ww1090408bhfemaexplained.4438053
4.html (with reference to Hurricane Gustav) (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
125 Id.
126 See Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122
BANKING L.J 483, 533 (2005).
127 See Amy Hoak, No More Easy Mortgage Money as Lenders Tighten
Standards, MarketWatch, Mar. 21, 2007 (Lenders now imposing tougher
underwriting standards, borrowers with a credit score below 620 hit hardest).
121 Credit scores are statistical evaluations of a person's creditworthiness,
based on credit reports compiled at credit bureaus. Lenders rely on credit
scores to determine whether a potential applicant will qualify for a loan, what
interest rate they will receive, the level of income and asset verification
necessary for approval, and what credit limit shall be imposed. Numerous
credit scoring methodologies exist, but by far the most relied upon is the
"FICO" score. An acronym abbreviating "Fair Isaac Corporation," the FICO
score is designed to measure a person's default risk. While the exact formula is
a closely guarded secret, it has been disclosed that the score is approximately
determined through a weighted contribution of 35% past payment punctuality,
30% debt to credit ratio, 15% length of credit history, 10% type of credit that
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information" within the credit reports of consumers who were
located in the counties affected by Katrina. Given that the
widespread financial hardship imposed by th e storm was so
unexpected, the organizations argued that a pre-Katrina score
was a better indicator of credit worthiness than a score that was
artificially depressed due to missed payments in the wake of the
disaster. Decisions to include "pre-disaster" scores were (and are)
entirely discretionary, as there are currently no laws regulating
credit reporting on disaster victims.
Because FICO indicated that such a change would require
considerable time to develop a system (over a year), the consumer
organizations requested direct assistance from the three largest
credit reporting groups, Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion.
Their hope was that a pre-disaster score would, at the very least,
be included in the notes section of the credit report.
According to academics involved in this request,
TransUnion did not respond to the proposal. Equifax. and
Experian, on the other hand, declined, stating that it was up to
the creditors themselves to make the decision about whether or
not negative information would be reported in disaster-affected
areas; and if so, whether they would like the report to reflect that
late payments were disaster related.129
In the following months, therefore, the credit scoring
system did little to ameliorate the scarring impact of Katrina-
related indebtedness. The number of people whose credit scores
were adversely affected by the hurricane grew, and they faced
ever greater difficulty as many of the delayed payment programs
offered by creditors ended. Further, because many borrowers had
been placed into temporary payment deferral programs, many
delinquencies precipitated by the storms were reported to credit
reporting agencies months after the storms had ended, thereby
complicating consumer credit risk analyses. 3 ° The acquisition of
apartment leases, car loans, mortgages, insurance, credit cards,
has been utilized in the past, and 10% recent searches for credit and recent
credit obtained.
129 See Daniel Solove, Hurricane Katrina and Credit Scores, Oct. 10,
2005, available at
http:concurringopinions.com/?s=hurricane+ Katrina+and+credit+scores (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (Quoting Rob Sullivan of MSNBC). Credit Reporting
agencies indicated that they were, however, asking lenders to include a special
"disaster recovery code" on Katrina-related overdue payment and default
entries, in which case a late payment entry would include the designation
"AW" on consumer credit reports.
130 Cheney & Rhine, supra note 52.
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and even jobs became progressively more difficult.13 1
Many consumers were reclassified as "subprime
borrowers" and were locked out of further borrowing from the
preferred or even usual lending rates of regular banks. 132 Given
the circumstances, pawnshops, check-cashing outlets, rent-to-own
stores, tax refund anticipation lenders, car-title pawnshops, cash
leasing operations, and other "second tier" credit providers
became more attractive than ever before. 133 Payday loans for an
amount of $300 often carry a nominal interest rate of up to 20%
but a much higher 521% APR. 134 Consumer bankruptcy,
repossession and foreclosure rates increased as these forms of
borrowing became more prevalent. 13 5
XII. Addressing the Need for Reform
The study above permits drawing several conclusions
about the application of traditional consumer law rules under the
circumstances of a major catastrophe, although an extended
analysis of possible solutions to the problems exposed by the
experience of Katrina consumers waits for another discussion.
136
131 See, e.g., Credit Reporting Agencies Reject an Important Step to Help
Hurricane Survivors, Oct. 6, 2005, available at http://www.consumer-
action.org/news/articles/credit-reporting-agencies-reject-an-important-step/
(providing overview of proposal) (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). See also Credit
Agencies Won't Give Katrina Victims A Break, Oct. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/katrinacredit.html (explaining
credit scoring impact on hurricane victims) (last visited Oct. 21, 2009); Gail
Hillebrand et al., Request To Develop "Disaster Information Shield,"
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/corefinancialservices/002656.html
(Sept. 12, 2005); Sullivan, supra note 124 (discussing "second wave of
hurricane"). Additionally, because those in the lower income brackets are
statistically less likely to obtain copies of their credit reports, and because the
contents of these reports may be missing key information or be outdated,
current credit scoring methodologies will have imposed further difficulties
upon victims of Hurricane Katrina as a class. See Todd B. Hilsee et al.,
Hurricanes, Mobility, and Due Process: The "Desire-To-Inform" Requirement
for Effective Class Action Notice is Highlighted by Katrina Hurricanes, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1771, 1793 (2006).
132 Id.
133 Id. See also, e.g., Paul Chessin, Borrowing From Peter To Pay Paul: A
Statistical Analysis of Colorado's Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U.L.
REV. 387, 406 (2005) (reporting an inverse relationship between income and
the likelihood of payday loan patronage).
134 Paul Chessin, supra note 131 at 390.
135 See discussion of the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, infra.
136 See Norman I. Silber, Ameliorating Consumer Finance Problems
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We have seen that the interruption of normal business-to-
consumer relationships by Hurricane Katrina (whether or not
exacerbated by human incompetence) happened outside the
control of affected consumers. In a country where the rules are
expected to promote fairness and efficiency, the impact of the
disaster should have excused consumers from the duty to meet
pre-established payment deadlines on their consumer contracts. It
should have simultaneously prevented creditors from extracting
interest charges against consumers during the period when even
basic services were unavailable (or, at a minimum, during the
three-month formal state of emergency which followed the
storm).
But the law did not operate that way. Although the
FFIEFC encouraged private sector entities to "contribute in ways
that are, in many cases, key to a community's successful recovery
after a catastrophic event," and urged them to contact local
chapters of community organizations to coalesce in cooperative
recovery efforts, the FFIEFC nevertheless failed to proscribe any
uniform principals or standards for doing so.137
We have seen that the proposals which were advanced in
Congress to address the national residential mortgage "melt-
down," and which would have allowed bankruptcy courts to
write down mortgage obligations in consumer cases, were
unsuccessful. These would have been especially helpful and
appropriate to address the inequitable treatment of mortgagors
who were caught up in Hurricane Katrina. 3 Perhaps the
Bankruptcy Code could have been amended more broadly to
govern disaster-related bankruptcies differently and more
empathetically than those resulting from routine business
conditions.'39
Caused By Catastrophes: The Case for Social Credit Insurance and Mandatory
Force Majeure Provisions in Consumer Financial Agreements, (forthcoming,
New York University Review of Law and Social Change, 2010).
117 Federal Financial Institutions Executive Council, Lessons Learned
from Hurricane Katrina: Preparing Your Institution for a Catastrophic Event,
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/katrinalessons.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
135 See, e.g., David Herszenhorn, Senate Rejects a Proposal to Allow
Bankruptcy Judges to Alter Home Mortgages, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008 at C5;
Jack Guttentag, U.S. Must Attack Foreclosure Rates, WASH. POST, Jan.31,
2009, at G2.
139 Michael A. Sabella, The Category 5 Crisis: How Hurricanes Katrina
And Rita Exposed Deficiencies In The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention And
Consumer Protection Act Of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 321, 324
(2007).
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We have seen that payment defaults were reported
without differentiation according to the calamitous cause, and
that these reports affected credit scores and dragged consumers
into predatory subprime borrowing. Creditors, when they
reported to credit scoring and reporting agencies, should have
been obligated to distinguish those cases arising from disastrous
circumstances. Scoring and ratings agencies, when they issued
reports, should have reported pre-disaster and post-disaster
results and analyses separately. The nonpayment or late payment
by debtors of their financial obligations during and immediately
following Hurricane Katrina was, for a very large number of
storm victims, fundamentally different, both financially and
economically, from those same payments in calmer periods (not to
mention significantly less useful to creditors in reflecting the
underlying creditworthiness of individuals in ordinary times).
The payment creditors failed to take into account the dire
circumstances facing consumers,and drove them further into
financial and economic distress. They displayed superficial
generosity in the wake of the storm, and were generous only
when government regulations and a calculation of interest
mandated such generosity. Most payment creditors, therefore,
returned to customary practices at the earliest opportunity - at a
time, unfortunately, when consumer susceptibility to taking on
greater debt was at its highest.
As a result, the impact of insufficiently discriminating credit
reporting appears to have been a more significant problem for
consumers than actual foreclosures, at least for the first two years
after the storm. Professor Brooke Overby reported that "while
mortgage defaults soared [in New Orleans in the first two years]
after Katrina, foreclosure rates elsewhere actually stalled during
the same period,' 140 In the time since Professor Overby's
observation, however, it appears that in 2008 and 2009, the
problem of foreclosures along the length of the Gulf Coast
outpaced the rest of the nation. The delay in foreclosures outside
of New Orleans due to market forces was probably only a
temporary reprieve.'
140 A. Brooke Overby, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post-Katrina New
Orleans, 48 B.C. L. REV. 851, 854 (2007).
141 See Christian Moises, Numbers Game: N.O. Area Foreclosure Spike
Fueled by More Than Recession, Experts Say, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUSINESS,
Aug. 5, 2009, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-
finance/banking-lending-credit/12622447-1.html (indication that postponed
Katrina-related foreclosures exacerbated the impact of the recession).
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The interest expenses generated by the massive
interruption of life along the Gulf Coast was attributable neither
to fault of the debtors, nor the creditors who lived along the Gulf
Coast. Why then would debtors be saddled with legal
responsibility for all of these costs?
The opportunity cost to the creditors who might have
loaned out money received from consumers during that period
should have been apportioned evenly between creditors and
consumers; subsidized partially by government relief payments
dedicated to that purpose; absorbed through a government-
sponsored risk-sharing program; or insured by creditors as a cost
of doing business. If the analysis advanced above is correct-
concerning the fundamental injustice of continuing interest
accruals-then the calculation of most account balances due was
faulty and should have provided grounds for reducing payment
obligations.
The story about what happened and is still happening to
consumers in the Gulf since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is, to a
certain degree, a model of what happens when social equilibrium
is disturbed. A natural disaster destroys lives and property,
creating losses for the whole community. Governments,
corporations, families, and individuals all suffer. Each is
adversely affected based heavily upon wealth, status, race, the
choices they have made, and pure chance; each is left differently
situated after the disaster. Almost every group suffered a loss due
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but some hardly lost anything
while others were devastated.
Through the lens of consumer welfare, a disturbing
pattern emerges. Most of the mainstream corporations tried to
establish that they were good corporate citizens using such
customary techniques as "cause" marketing, charitable giving and
revamped customer relations. The payment creditors took this
approach, making efforts to project corporate compassion and to
emphasize their tolerance of delay if there were good faith efforts
to bring payment schedules back to normal.
Most large retail merchants understood from the
beginning that their customers would have a very limited ability
to meet their recurring obligations, and that aggressive debt-
collection efforts in the early phases would have been
counterproductive.
Businesses in the affected areas also realized that
economic performance and, in some cases, survival, depended
2009
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upon delaying rather than forgiving payment obligations.
Companies understood that long-term success would require
waiting for customers to rebuild their income and a normal
routine before imposing new "catch-up" burdens on them. They
understood that they would have to play tough with respect to
their own contractual obligations and try to make the most of the
harsh contracts their customers had signed. They took advantage
of the standard form contractual provisions in their customer
agreements which consumers did not actually bargain for in the
first place.
After a decent interval, most creditors took the tough
collection efforts they believed were necessary and legal to shift
losses from their shareholders and management onto their
customer base. This shift was made possible by standard-form
contract provisions, judicial remedies, and self-help repossessions,
which applied regardless of natural disasters or other
catastrophes. Provisions which, in ordinary times, would have
been applied on an individual basis were applied wholesale.
Today, the websites of the commercial groups discussed
above are by-and-large devoid of web pages addressed to
accommodating the consumer problems of victims of the
hurricanes. 142 A return to "business as usual," or as close to usual
as possible, became imperative for the weary business community
and the devastated local population. This return to normalcy,
however, required consumers to continue to bear misfortunes of
the past that were not of their own making.
The enforcement of standard form consumer payment
instruments and credit agreements worked to the benefit of many
companies-but it brought a second-wave financial catastrophe
to consumers. Preventing financial storms from so painfully
descending on consumers presents a daunting challenge for the
future.Y1
3
142 Indeed, the web pages relating to corporate policies toward storm
victims have largely been pulled down, requiring a large amount of the
research for this paper to be accomplished through the use of the "Wayback
Machine," see http://www.archive.org/index.php;, follow "Take me Back"
hyperlink, a website which allows for a view of websites as they appeared in
the past.
143 Approaches to meeting this challenge are considered in Norman I.
Silber, Ameliorating Consumer Finance Problems Caused By Catastrophes:
The Case for Social Credit Insurance and Mandatory Force Majeure
Provisions in Consumer Financial Agreements, (forthcoming, NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 2010).
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